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Of all the borderlands of the Soviet Union, Transcaucasia po-ec-
vides the Lva4 favorable conditions for the development of strong
nationality movements. The following circumstances account for this:
a relatively isolated location, Transcaucasia being removed a good
distance from the center of Russia and protected by two seas and a
range of high mountains: ancient native cultures capable of facing
Russian culture on a certain footing of equality a numerous local
intelllgentsia; and an economy which, in relation to the USSR as a
whole, is on the decline.
A'nong the native nationalities the Georgians have.shown over
the past fifty years the greatest degree of cultural and demographic
dynamism. Although less urbanized that the Armenians and less fertile
than the Azeri Turks they have demonstrated the most steady population
growth. Their population is highly concentrated. They have probably
the highest proportion of persons with a middle and higher education
of any borderland area in the Soviet Union, which means that they
dispose of a large intelligentsia to carry out administrative and
economic functions. They have shown no tendency to assimilate, and
indeed have themselves been assimilating some of the minor Transcau-
casian groups. And finally, between 1932 and 1953 they enjoyed,
thanks to the Georgian origin of Stalin and Berta, a certain privileged
position in Soviet society. All these factors have helped to establish
2a Georgian hegemony in Tr'anscaucasia.
In reaction to this the two other major nationalities, the
Armenians and Ameri Turks, have tended to draw together in a common
front against the Georgians. The Armeno-Trkic rapprochement was
assisted by the fact that most of the causes which had engendered
their mutual hostility before the revolution are gone. The reli-
gious conflict has subsided as a result of the elimination of reli-
gion from public life; the social conflicts.bas been undermined by
the destruction of the Armenian middle class; and the racial antagn-
ism, prompted by the persecution of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire,
has lost much of its intensity because there no longer is any Armenian
problem in Turkey. The Armenians and Azer Turks, regarding them-
selves (and not without justice) as second-rate citizens in regard to
the Russians and Georgians, find a certain community of interest in
opposing their more powerful neighbors.
In Transcaucasia, the Russians play a relatively minor role.
They have never exceeded 15 per cent of the total population, and
have been largely confined to the two major cities, Baku and Tiflis.
There is no evidence of any increase in the number of Russians residing
in Transcaucasia after the war. In fact, it is more than likely that
the Russians have actually been leaving Transcaucasia as a result
of the gradual shift of the petroleum industry from Baku and environs
to the Urals.
3In their Transcaucasian policy the Communists have tended to
follow a divide et impera policy, with slight favoritism toward
the Armenians. The Armenians, as the least nationalistic, least
land-rooted group are the natural allies of Soviet power with which,
in addition, they share a common tradition of hostility to the
Ottoman Turks.
There is thus something akin to a balance of power in Transcau-
casia. On the one hand are the Georgians, on the other the Armenians
and Azeri Turks, the former of whom enjoy a certain measure of Soviet
and Russian support. In all three republics, however, (except to
some extent in Azerbaijan) the local regimes are native in composi-
tion and orientation. The Russians here seem less to rule (directly
at any rate) than to supervise. The position of Transcaucasia in the
Soviet empire resembles more closely that of a satellite than of a
borderland area. For some time Russia's primary interest in this
area has been strategic.
Economically, Transcaucasia has been developing less rapidly
than the USSR as a whole. This fact can be illustrated in several
ways. One is to look at the history of the republican budgets. Be-
fore World War II Transcaucasia's share of the all-Union republican
budgets (,e., moneys allotted by the government for local use) was
customarily around 10-12 per cent. After the war it dropped to 6
per cent, and it has been declining ever since, having dropped last
4year to an all-time low of 4.4 per cent. Another way of illustrating
this decline is to trace Transcaucasiats share in Soviet industrial
growth. The growth of industrial output in the three Transcaucasian
republics since 1940 has been consistently slower than in the USSR.
This holds especially true of the two most industrialized republics,
Azerbaijan and Georgia.
The relative economic decline produces a variety of effects which
are not without bearing on the nationality question in this area. On
the one hand, the population, and especially the intelligentsia, is
dissatisfied by material deprivation caused by the failure of the
Soviet regime to invest heavily in this region; the slow development
of housing facilities is only one of the deprivations. On the other
hand, an area lying outside the mainstream of Soviet economic develop-
ment enjoys a measure of autonomy and freedom from Russian population
pressure which areas of intense economic growth do not. Both these
factors are propitious for local nationalism.
From the point of view of cultural development, the Transcaucasian
nationalities seem to have been undergoing a process of secularization
and Westernization, through the medium of Russian culture, observed in
other borderland regions of the Soviet Union. If the process here is
somewhat less dramatic than elsewhre it is because it got underway
some time before the Communist conquest, and in some ways goes back
to the mid-19th century.
5Broadly speaking, in the past fifty years the population of
Transcaucasia has been transforming itself from a loose agglomeration
of small group whose loyalties were to their religion and locality
into three cohesive nationalities. This process of transformation
was spontanenous in its impetus, but it was also assisted, for reasons
which cannot be gone into here, by the Soviet regime. The three
nationalities are, of course, the Georgians, the Armenians, and the
Azeri Turks. The Georgian nationality has emerged through the fusion
of the various Kartvel groups (including the Mingrelians, Svanetians,
and Imeretians) and the assimilation of some minor Christian groups
of non-Kartvel origin. The Armenians in particular have proved them-
selves succeptible to the lure of Georgian culture, and a certain pro-
portion of the Armenian population residing in Georgia has become
linguistically assimilated. The Azeri Turks have been absorbing the
smaller Muslim nationalities, while the Armenians, whose loyalty to
their culture is least developed, have assimilated some Kurdish groups.
None of the three principal Transcaucasian groups has shown itself
susceptible to Russification. Tn Georgia the use of Russian is
virtually unknown in the villages and smaller towns, and even the
intelligentsia (including leading members of the Academy of Sciences)
speak it poorly.
Intermarriage between Russians and natives is rare, although
not as exceptional as in Central Asia. Due to their common
6religious heritage, intermarriage involves for Russians, Armenians,
and Georgians less of a break with their cultures than it does for
Russians and Muslims. But the cultural gap is wide enough to prevent
intermarriage from assuming significant proportions. Georgians have
told this writer that Russians and Georgians at the university fre-
quently dated each other. But the question whether they also married
elicited an emphatic "no". The reason given was"difference in cus-
toms and traditions". This is less of a factor in cases of intermar-
iage involving Armenians. The Armenians who marry outside their
nationality, whether with Russians or Georgians, seem to become
assimilated, and their children are no longer considered Armenians.
Despite growing "modernization" of local life, social customs
seem to survive. An example of this is the local attitude toward
the gainful employment of girls and young women. Traditionally,
Transcaucasians regarded it as highly improper for women to work
outside the home. The Communists, for reasons which are obvious, have
been very anxious to alter this attitude, and to drive able-bodied
women to work. One of the methods which they employed and still
employ is to pay such low wages to the men that the female members of
the family too must seek work. Despite this economic pressure one
almost never sees in Tiflis a Georgian girl in a place of public
employment; on those jobs where women are usually employed (eg., in
restaurants and on street-cars) they are invariably Russian. The reason
7for this unwillingness of Georgian girls to find jobs is the strict
conception of morality which Georgians apply to their own race. A
woman publicly employed in subjected to such abuse that with the
best intention she cannot maintain the self-respect which natives
expect of her. Conversations with natives confirm the impression
that Georgian gizls past the age of adolescence stay home under
their mother's watchful eye.
The natives display much the same traditionalism in their other
habits and attitudes, including food. In this respect the situation
in Transcaucasia does not differ from that obserw'able in any other
area inhabited by minorities.
In view of the absence of all data it is very difficult to form
any opinion of the attitude of the natives toward foreign powers. One
thing, however, is fairly certain. The pro-Western, pro-Russian, and
pro-Turkish attitudes which characterized respectively Georgian,
Armenian, and Azerbaijani politics before the revolution have become
significantly modified. Two factors account for this: the memory
of actual independence during 1918-21, intensified by the trappings of
pseudo-independence provided by the Communists since 1921, and the
emergence of a host of new Middle Eastern states after World War II.
Both mean that the Transcaucasian nationalities can rely more heavily
on their own resources and on alliances with the new Middle Eastern
states, and less on the Western powers and Russia. As for Azerbaijan
and Turkey there is little reason to suspect deep feelings of sym-
pathy between them. Thanks to its colonial status Azerbaijan has
8developed in some ways more rapidly than Turkey, and if the experience
of Azeri Turkic DP's is any indication, Ameri intellectuals consider
themselves more truly "Western" than their Turkish cousins. In other
words, today the Western powers and Turkey can count less on the polit-
ical sympathies of the Transcaucasians than in the decades preceding
the revolution. The cultural pull to the West, on the other hand, is
every bit as strong among the youth of Transcaucasia as it is among
the youth of Russia, and if anything stronger than it was before 1917.
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Preface
In studying the nationality question in Russia one sooner or
later arrives at the conclusion that it is to a large extent a by-
product of demography. What is decisive in the long run is not the
abilit y of the Russians to assimilate culturally the national mxi-
norities, for assimilation has proven effoctive only in the case of
small and isolated social or ethnic groups; nor is it the hostility
(or lack of it) between the Russians and non-Russians, since the
relationship between nationalities is usually the result rather than
the cause of nationalism. The decisive factor is the capacity of
the minorities to withstand the relentless Russian population move-
ment which presses outward, toward the peripheries of the state,
century after century, regardless of how or by whom the country is
ruled. The history of Russia is still largely a history of coloni-
zation. Some nationalities, such as the Finns inhabiting the
central provinces of the state, have been fully swallowed by this
movement, and disappeared. Others, including the modern Ukrainians,
have developed as it vere a split personality, with the urban
population becoming Russified, and the rural one retaining native
traditiors and loyalties. This process is a long-term one. It
cannot be studied from year to year or even from decade to decade,
but demands to be viewed from the perspective of many decades.
The present essay is an attempt to analyze the evolution of the
nationality question in terms of demographic development in a
1
2region where it has become acute in relatively recent times, and
where its outcome is as yet uncertain. Transcaucasia came into
Russian hands only one hundred and fifty years ago. Administratively
it was fully incorporated into the Russian Empire fifty years later,
and the influx of Russians began only toward the end of the nine-*
teenth century0 The demographic pressures, therefore, have gotten
under way at a time which is too close to us to permit conclusive
generalizations about their ultimate result. On the other hand,
here the period of greatest demographic changes can be studied by
means of statistics which are not available for older times.
This inquiry begins with the year 1897, the year of the Pirst
All-Russian Census, and ends vith 1956. Its immediate puroose
is to determine the relative capacity of the principal Trans-
caucasian groups to weather the various upheavals which this area
has experienced over the past sixty years, to adapt themselves to
changing political and economic conditions, and to evolve viable
and demographically sound population structures0
The sources of information are of two kinds: statistical and
historical. The statistical data are derived mainly from the census
reports (1897, 1926, and 1939), and from information released by the
Soviet government at various times between the ce rmuses. This
information is by no means as definitive as the elaborate absolute
figures and percentiles may lead one to think0 In the first place,
the criteria used by the various censuses are not the same; this
is particularly true of so ambivalent a category as "nationality."
In the second place, there are long periods between the censuses
3when we have no information at all, and must rely on interpola--
tions the accuracy of which is always questionable. In the third
place, the census data for 1939 have been very likely deliberately
falsified, since it replaced the census of 1937 which had been
declared "incorrect"; in any event, its results have not been fully
published even at this late date. Finally, there has been no
census at all since 1939, which means that the past two decades are
not subject to statistical analysis except in a mast general way.
Because of the inadequacy of the statistical information, it
is necessary to have recourse to historical sources to help fill
in the gaps and clear up obscurities. It is also necessary to
depend on inference, interpolation, and plain guess. Mty method
of computing the ethnic structure and urban population of the
Transcaucasian republic in 1939 is very rough at best, and certainly
makes no claim at being "scientific." In fact, all information on
the Deriod 1932-1956, i.e., for nearly one-half of the whole period
under study, is approximate.
But although the factual basis of this study is not as solid
as one may wish, the end-result is consistent enough to inspire
confidence. The advantage of undertaking a long-term study is that
even if the individual parts are hazy in spots, the total effect,
when seen from a distance, is fairly clear, That is to say, the
sum-total is more cogent than the component parts, I hope the con-
clusions will seem as convincing to the reader as they do to me.
In any event the materials gathered in this study provide a good
vantage point from which to analyze the results of the forthcoming
Soviet census, nromised for next year.
I would like here to thank the Center for International
Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for its
generous assistance in gathering the information and analyzing
the facts presented in this report.
Cambridge, Massachusetts
April, 1957
5The Population in 1897
According to the First All-Russian Census of 1897 the region
of Transcaucasia had the following demographic characteristics:
a high fertility ratio, a high proportion of children and men, a
predominantly settled, rural population with comparatively little
movement between districts and provinces, and low urbanizationa1
The fertility index for Transcaucasia as a whole stood in
1897 at 876.2 In areas which were least urbanized, such as the
province of Elizavetopol, this index rose as high as 1,032. Trans-
caucasia thus was a region with a high rate of natural growth.
(Table 3).
A reflection of this fact may be seen in the age distribution
which was heavily balanced in favor of the young. Thanks to its
fertility, the population of Transcaucasia had the lowest average
age in the whole Russian empire (23.94 years as compared to 25.16).
Forty point three per cent of its inhabitants were children of
15 or less, as compared to 37.9 per cent in the empire as a whole,
(Table t). Closely connected with this phenomenon (due to the
normal preponderance of boys at birth)vas the high sex ratio, the
highest in Russia: for every 100 women there were 117 men. (Table
5).
Since the majority of the inhavitants engaged in agricultural
and pastoral pursuits, there was relatively little urbanization0 .
1. In the discussion of the prerevolutionary period, the term
"Transcaucasia" is understood to include the provinces of
Baku and Elizavetopol (later Azerbaijan), Erivan (Armenia),
Tiflis and Kutais (Georgia), and the Districts of Kars and
Zakataly.
2. This index is arrived at by dividing the number of children
aged 5 and under by the number of women aged 1L4 inclusive,
and multiplying the result by 1,000.
6The census reoorted 1h.h per cent of the inhabitants as urban, but
even this figure is prbbably somewhat high by usual demographic
standards. 1 The low degree of urbanization also tended to favor a
high birth rate.
The vast majority of the inhabitants spent their lives in the
same localities in which they were born* Since the influx of out-
siders was as yet insignificant, it is not surprising that between
90 and 95 per cent of the inhabitants in each of the five provinces
(Kars excepted) were reported by the census as residing in their
native districts. (Table 8).
Ethnograohically, the population consisted of four principal
groups: Azeri Turks, Armenians, Georgians, and Russians.
1. Unike most mdern states which classify a settlement as urban
when its population exceeds a certain number of inhabitants,
Russia (Tsarist as well as Soviet) does so on the basis of a
legal definition: a settlement becomes urban when it is so
declared by the government. The term "urban" in Russia, there-
fore, has not so much a demographic as a legal and administrative
connotation. That the two are not identical can be seen on
the example of the 1926 data for Azerbaijan. These data reveal
that four settlements with a population of 1,000 or less each
were listed as "urban," whereas five others, each with 5,000-
10,000 inhabitants, were listed as "rural*" In a dynamic
country such as the Soviet Union, one obsessed with the ambition
of catching up with the most industrialized countries of the
West, such a method of computing the urban population favors and
tends to give an inflated picture of urbanization. If one were'
to classify the urban population of Transcaucasia in 1926 by
drawing an arbitrary line at 5,000 inhabitants (a compromise
between the standards employed by some Western and Far Eastern
states), the proportion of those living in urban areas would
decline by some 10 per cent (from 2b.l per cent to 21.7 per cent).
The situation is further complicated by the fact that there is
little individual farming in Transcaucasia; there the bulk of
the population lived and continues to live in fairly large
villages which do not lose their purely rural character even
when they do grow above a few thousand inhabitants, In addition,
the Soviet regime makes use of an ambivalent category "settle-
ments of urban type" which includes housing developments for
workers. Thus since the Soviet government is interested in
showing the most rapid orogress of urbanization possible, and
yet is not hindered by anything from increasing the ratio of
7The Azeri Turks were racially and linguistically related to
the Turks of the Ottoman Empire, but in their religious practices
they were closer to the Persians, because they adhered to the
Shiite branch of Islam. Approximately one third of the Azeri Turks
lived in Transcaucasia, and the remainder in northwest Persia.
They were an agricultural and pastoral people, whose elite con-
sisted largely of well-to-do landowners, By 1897 one could discern
the emergence of a small Muslim industrial proletariat in connection
with the nascent petroleum industry in and around Baku., This
oroletariat was made up of unskilled Turkic and Persian laborers.
Two-thirds of the Russian Azeri Turks lived in the provinces of
Baku and Elizavetopol, and one-third in rural settlements of the
adjoining provinces of Erivan and Kutais.
The Armenians were, like the Russians and Georgians, Orthodox
Christians but with their own church establishment. Culturally
they had little in common with the Muslims next to and among whom
they lived, and whose way of life they largely shared. In view
of the mounting Turkish-Armenian conflict in the Ottoman Empire,
repercussions of which were felt in Transcaucasia, the Armenians
tended to draw nearer to the Christians, such as Russians and
Georgians. As in the case of the Azeri Turks, only a minority of
the Armenians resided in Transcaucasia; the majority lived under
the Turks, and there were many scattered in towns of Russia proper
(e.g., !ostov on Don). The bulk of the Armenians in 'ranscaucasia
consisted of peasants (71.2 Der cent), but the proportion of those
urban inhabitants by the simple orocedure of legislative fiat,
one must approach . all urbanization data in Russia, especially
since 1928, with utmost caution0
8who worked on their own land was smaller than among either the
Azeri Turks or Georgians (49 per cent for the Armenians, 65 Der
cent for the Georgians, and 68 per cent for the Azeri Turks). The
Armenians had the largest middle class. It consisted of traders
and industrial employees. In consequence of this peculiar social
structure, the Armenians were most urbanized of the native nationali-
ties, and territorially least concentrated. Two-thirds of the
Armenians resided in the Erivan province, while the remainder was
rather thinly distributed in urban and rural settlements of the
other four provinces.
The Georgians, like the Armenians, were Orthodox. They too,
therefore, were oriented toward Russia, and their intelligentsia
was remarkably Westernized0 This intelligentsia descended mainly
from the dclassd nobility which ras largest in Transcaucasia.
It was nolitically very active, and already at the end of the nine-
teenth centuryassumed a strongly pro-marxist attitude. The bulk
of the Georgian population was made up of peasants. The Georgians
were the most compactly settled group: 98 per cent of all the
Georgians in Russia resided in the provinces of Tiflis and Kutais.
The Russians were relative newcomers to this area, nost of them
having settled there since the middle of the nineteenth century. 2
1. Te nobility in the predominantly Georgian provinces of Tiflis
and Kutais comprised b .2 per cent and 6.9 per cent of the popu-
lation ," in the Armenian orovince of Erivan it was 1.3 per cent,
and among the Azeri Turks 2.8 Der cent and 3.5 per cent (Baku
and Elizavetopol).
2. The term "Russians" will be here used to include also the
Ukrainians and Belorussians. There are at least two good
reasons for so doing: (1) In a strange environment the
cultural differences among the East Slav groups tend to dis-
appear, and (2) a large proportion of the migrant Ukrainians
and Belorussians intermarries with Russians because of the
9Aproroximately half of the Russians lived in the cities, where they
worked for the government, or in their own commercial and professional
enterprises. The other half lived in small but compact rural
settlements, outstanding among rhich were the colonies of the Old
Believers south of Baku, and the villages planted by the Russian
government along the strategic road linking Erivan with Tiflis.
The remaining national groups consisted of two principal sub-
divisions: minorities of :,uropean origin, and minorities of Middle
Eastern origin. The first of these subdivisions included Poles,
Germans, Greeks, European Jews; the latter, Adjars, Abkhazians,
Ossetes, Tats, Talysh, ard local Jews (from the Muntains of
Daghestan, and from Georgia).. The tendency of most of the nationalie
ties in this category was to identify the uselves, at least
olitically, with the major groups most closely related to them in
culture, religion, and speech. This meant in the case of the
European minorities identification with the Russians, and of the
native ones with one of the three principal Transcaucasian
nationalities,
Considering the ethnic diversity of Transcaucasia there was
remarkably little crosing of cultural lines. This fact can be
illustrated to some extent statistically in the case of one of the
most important criteria of nationality, namely language. Since the
1897 census did not report on ethnic affiliations, it is not
shortage of women of their own nationality. This is due to
the common tendency of a migratory population to be heavily
male. In Arnenia in 1926, for exarple, there were 1,587
Ukrainian men and only 18 women. With the passage of time, the
Ukrainians and Belorussians living in such remote areas, there-
fore, merge with the Great Russians culturally as well as
demographically.
10
oossible to show precisely how much each group adhered to its
native language, but a juxtaposition of the data on the linguistic
and religious status (which, in the case of some nationalities,
was practically identical) shows how little linguistic assimilation
there was. Where it did occur at all, the language which replaced
the original one was not so much Russian as Caucasian. The Armenians,
as the most urbarnzed and least compact group, were most likely
to succumb to the influence of other cultures. Yet a comparison
of the number of inhabitants reported as professing the Armenow
Gregorian or Armeno-Catholic faiths reveals that only 3 per cent
of them st-oke languages other than Armenian: of these, 35,000
Georgian, and 1,000 Russian. The Muslims were almost one hundred
per cent Turkic or Persian in their language; the number of those
who considered Russian their mother tongue was a mere 200, and of
those who adopted Georgian or Armenian even smaller. There is
every reason to assume that the Georgians, for whom no such
statistics are available because they were considered as belonging
to the same church as the Russians, were equally loyal to their
native language.
If we row turn to the four principal nationalities which are
the subject of this inquiry, we find that they showed significant
demographic peculiarities.
Fertility was highest among the Azeri Turks, with the Armenians
following closely behind. The Georgians stood half-way between
these two groups and the Russians, who were the least fertile of
all. Agegrise, the Georgians showed the highest proportion of
children, then came the Azeri Turks, Armenians, and, last of all,
31
the Russians. The Russians, on the other hand, were most highly
urbanized (60 per cent); the Armenians came second (20 per cent),
the Azeri Turks and other Muslims third (10 per cent), the Georgians
last (9 per .cent).
The Inter-Census Period 1897-1926
The time which elapsed between the census of 1897 and the
Soviet census of 1926 cannot be studied with much statistical
precision, because, apart from some scattered and often unreliable
data, there are no population figures for it. To understand what
happened to the inhabitants of Transcaucasia during this turbulent
era, and what the first Soviet census was later to reveal, one
must largely rely on history.
The three decades can be historically divided into two unequal
teriods. The f irst period (1897-1911) was one of peace, prosperity,
and growth, during which the population increased by natural means
as well as by immigration. The second period (1914-1926) was one
of war, genocide, and conquest, in the course of which the popula-
tion not only failed to show the norral growth, but in some respects
declined.
Between the census of 1897 and the outbreak of World War I
the population of Transcaucasia increased by one and a half million,
i.e., by an average of 1.7 per cent annually. How much of this
increase was due to the excess of births over deaths, and how much
to influx of immigrants from other parts of the country we do not
know; but the relatively small increase in the number of Russians
over the whole inter-census period (from 209,000 to 375,000 in 1926)
12
suggests that immigration was rather a minor factor. This was a
time of rapid urbanization, during which the areas connected with
the petroleum industry (Baku, Batum) and transport (Tiflis,
Aleksandropol, and others) experienced something of a boom.
The social changes which Transcaucasia underwent during the
1897-1911 period produced, as may be expected, a certain amount of
friction, which often took the form of national antagonism The
most pronounced conflict was that between the Azeri Turks and
Armenians. It was in part a conflict between the Azeri peasant
and laborer and the Armenian petty bourgeois (not unlike that in
which the Jews in Eastern Europe were involved), and in part a
reflection of the mounting wave of anti-Armenian feeling in the
Ottoman Empire.
The convulsions which all Russia underwent during the subse-
quent period (1931-1926) affected Transcaucasia somewhat later
than other parts of the Empire, and had a different impact on the
various nationalities* But in the end the population losses for
the entire area were heavy, and Transcaucasia entered the trying
years of Stalinist dictatorship with a population no larger than
that which it had had at the beginning of World War I.
The war itself spared Transcaucasia. The Russian armies in
the Caucasus went on the offersive early in 1915, and from then on
until the October Revolution the major campaigns were waged on
Turkish territory. In the course of these campaigns, however, the
Turks carried out a frightful massacre of Anatolian Armenians,
whom they charged with pro-Russian sympathies. In these massacres
an estimated one million Armenians were killed or died. Several
13
hundred thousand Armenian refugees fled to the Russian Caucasus,
where their ordeal added nore fuel to the smouldering fires of
Armenian-Azeri Turkic hostility. In early 1918, during the short.
lived Communist government of Baku (the so-called "Baku Commune")
the Armenians, assisted by the Bolsheviks, carried out a massacre
of the Azeri Turksb In the meantime the Russian troops, influenced
by Bolshevik propaganda, deserted the front lines, and the Turks
virtually walked into Trarscaucasia. They headed directly for
Baku, which they seized in the fall. There they helped the Azeri
Turks to revenge themelves on the Armenians for the events of the
preceding spring, and so the mutual slaughters continued.
The Georgians escaped for a long time the horrors which had
visited their neighbors. This they did first b- olacing thenselves
under a benevolent German protectorate (1918), a nd then by establishing
a comparatively efficient Georgian -republic (1919 and 1920). But
in 1921 the Communists invaded Georgia, and after short and intense
fighting, occupied it. In 1924 the Georgians rebelled. This up-
rising, as well as the Azeri Turkic revolt of 1920, and Armenian of
1921, were bloodily suppressed.
Little wonder that the population of Transcaucasia appeared
decimated once Soviet rule was firmly established there* The
Armenians showed the heaviest losses. According to Soviet estimates,
the Armenian population of Transcaucasia declined between 191b and
1920 by one half million: 200,000 in consequence of Turkish, and,
presumably Communist, massacres, and 300,000 from other causes,
mostly famine and disease. The population of the area included in
14
today's Armenia dropped from over one million in 1914 to 780,000
in 1920.1 After its conquest by the Bolsheviks, therefore, the
Armenian reoublic consisted of approximately 500,000 local residents,
and approximately 280,000 refugees. As a result of the losses
suffered during and immediately after World War I, the demographic
gains made by the Armenians between 1897 and 1914 were entirely
wiped out, One of the by-products of these disasters was a con-
siderable decline in the birth rate during the decade 1911-1921,
so that in 1926 the Armenians oroved to be particularly short of
children aged 5-15.
There are no statistics for the Georgians comparable to those
available for the Armenians. It does seem that they were growing
normally until the time of the Communist invasion which occurred
in February 1921, and that most of their population losses were a
consequence of the conquest and 192h revolt. A Soviet source
estimates the population of Georgia in 1921 at 2,677,000 of which
17.7 per cent (75,000) is urban.2 The census of 1926 reported the
population at 2,667,000 indicating 'an actual decline of 10,000; it
must be rembered, however, that Georgia lost certain territories
to Azerbaijan in the early 1920's.
The population of Azerbaijan was reported in 1921-1923 at
1,863,000.3 Between this time and 1926 Azerbaijan was enlarged by
1. Institut Ekonomiki Akademii Nauk Armianskoi SS? i Institut
Geografii Akademii Nauk $SR, ArmianskaiA SSR, (Mloscow, 1955), 50.
2. Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Geografii, Grusinskaia SSR,
(Moscow, 1956), 53.
3. Uoravlenie Narodno-khoziaistvenno o ucheta ASSR, Narodnoe
khoziaistvo Azerbaidzhana, (/Baku/, 193b), Ul.
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the addition of Zakataly (from Georgia) and Nakhichevan (from
Armenia), each with about 100,000 inhabitants. In 1926 the popu-
lation of Azerbaijan was reported as 2,315,000--a growth of some
13 per cent in three to five years.
The total population of Transcaucasia at the time of the final
establishment of Soviet power in that area may be estimated on the
basis of Soviet sources at 5,321,000. This figure represents a net
loss of 670,000 since 1914 .l
But statistics tell only a part of the story of Transcaucasia
during the inter-census period. During these three decades the
population not only suffered heavy losses; it also underwent social
changes which influenced avpreciably the internal and external
situation of the nationalities.
The first striking change was the growth of the urban population,
which increased between 1897 and 1926 from l6.h per cent to 24.1
per cent. A breakdown of the available figures indicates that
this growth was not continuous.. The urban population of Trans-
caucasia in 1920-1921 was 20.6 per cent 2 ---that is to say, it in-
creased 6.2 per cent in the pre-Soviet period, and only 3.5 per
cent in the Soviet one. The growth of urbanization occurred largely
as a result of the industrial expansion of the first decade of the
twentieth century,
I. ThIs decline is in part explainable by the change in the Russo-
Turkish frontier, In the Brest Litovsk peace treaty, Lenin
had ceded to the Turks the Kars District with some 300,000
inhabitants.
2, Armenia 17 oer cent, Azerbaijan 26 per cent, and Georgia 17
per cent.
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The second change, closely connected with the economic ex-
nansion which accounted for urbanization, was the increased mobility
of the population* Movement between district and district, province
and province, village and village became more and more frequent; the
area was beginning to lose its self-contained, settled character.
The growing mobility tended to make the various nationalities more
conscious of their ethnic identity, and to lend the local oolitical
movements, which matured very rapidly in times of revolution and
chaos, a pronouncedly national character.
Each of the major nationalities had its own national party
even before World War I. Georgian political life was dominated by
the Social-Democrats, largely of a Menshevik orientation* The
Georgian MIarxists were at first aggressively antinationalist. They
preached internationalism, and argued to their more nationally-
minded neighbors that the road to salvation lay through the world-
wide socialist movement. But they quickly abandoned their inter-
nationalism when, in the course of 1918-1919, their land was
threatened first by the Whites and then by the Reds. They then
adapted their new-found nationalism to the Marxism which they con.
tinued to profess, evolving in the orocess an amalgam of nationalism
and socialism which has proven a very potent force among newly
liberated colonial peoples ever since, The Armenians and Azeri
Turks had no such qualms. Their political life took from the very
beginning a clearly nationalist orientation, due perhaps to the
fact that before the Revolution their mutual hositility was the
outstanding problem facing both these nationalities, Both the
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Dashnaktsutiun , with its predominantly bourgeois and petty
bourgeois membership, and the Mussavat, which united the Azeri
Turkic landlords and intellectuals, were openly nationalistic from
their very inception.
During the period of the Revolution and Civil War these three
parties took over the administrative responsibilities for the areas
of Transcaucasia most heavily populated by their respective nationali-
ties. Thus between 1918 and 1920, political authority rested in
the hands of the nationalities themselves. What this did to their
national egos can be easily imagined. Due to accident of war and
revolution, they were suddenly transformed from passive, subject
peoples into independent, sovereign nations.. It is irrelevant to
inquire whether the three Transcaucasian reoublics which had
emerged in 1918 were viable: judged by the test of viability a
considerable proportion of sovereign states today in existence would
have to be condemned to disanpearance. What natters is that
political independence, once tasted, produces a situation,
psychological as well as material, which is most conducive to the
development of national consciousness. National pride, the feeling
of belonging to a real "nation," spread among the people and re-
mained even after the reoublics and their leading parties had been
suppressed by the ComtUnists. It is not far-fetched to say that the
experiences of the revolution transforned the ethnic groups into
full-fledged nationalities.
Thus the inter-census period was one of important changes.
During this period the population experienced a relatively slow
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rate of growth (if one takes into consideration its phenomenal
fertility), but at this time it went a long way towards trans-
forming itself from an agglomeration of self-contained ethnic
groups into a more mobile and nationally conscious modern society.
The Population in 1926
The first Soviet cermus, conducted in 1926, conveyed the im-
pression that dernograohically there had been no profound changes
in the structure of the Transcaucasian nationalities toward each
other, or toward the population of the Soviet Union as a whole.
Everything that had been said of the Transcaucasian population as
of 1897 applied also in 1926, only a bit less so, The process of
transition toward a more complex modern society was obviously a
and
slow/gradual one.
As stated above, owing to the losses incurred during the decade
1914-1924, the population had shown little or no gain since the
outbreak of World War I.
The fertility index had fallen somewhat, but it was still
high, higher than in any other region of the Soviet Union. For
Transcaucasia as a whole it stood at 76 (compared to 876 in 1897).,
(Table 12).
There was a slight shift in the age distribution. The popula-
tion was somewhat older than in 1897, but still young compared to
1. T7Ine were to compute the fertility index for Transcaucasia
using the same standards as those commonly employed in the United
States (i.e., children 5 and under, and women 20-4h), the index
for 1926 would rise to 970. In the United States at this time
(1930) the index stood at h81 for Whites and h97 for "legroes.
Transcaucasian fertility in 1926 was comprarable to that of the
United States at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
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the population of the USSR as a whole. 'The proportion of children
had
14 and under/dropped from h0.3 per cent in 1897 to 39.6 oer cent (in
the USSR it was in 1926, 37.2 per cent). The population of o rking
age (15-60) also declined slightly (from 53.8 oer cent to 52.8 per
cent) so that the oldest group alone showed a gain. This ageing
was in nart due to the heavy losses suffered by the younger popula-
ti on during the disorders of 1917-192b , with the attendant decline
in birth rates, and in part to growing urbanization.
Urbanization showed a gain of 9.7 rer cent as compared with
1897, but two-thirds of that gain had occurred before 1921, i.e.,
before the Soviet regime had seized Transcaucasia.
The most startling demographic change was in the sex ratio
which dropped from 117 in 1897 to 106, (Table 1).
The census documented statistically the population movement
which had been under way during the preceding three decades due
to industrialization and the influx of refugees. In Transcaucasia
as a whole 10.5 per cent of the inhabitants were born outside their
place of residence. This figure was aporoximately twice that of
1897.
The relative fertility ranking of the four principal nationali-
ties was the same as it had been in 1897, with the Azeri Turks and
Armenians leading, followed at some distance by the Georgians, and
the Russians far in the rear. (Table 12). The proportion of
children showed the same order: Turks, Armenians, Georgians,
Russians. The Russians had the highest proportion of persons of
working age (>8.5 per cent), the Armenians the lowest (h867 per cent).
(Table 13). The sex ratio was highest among the Azeri Turks (111);
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it did not differ significantly among the remaining groups, varying
between 100 and 103. (Table 1h).
The Russians continued to be the most heavily urbanized
ethnic group, with 73.3 per cent of the Russian-soeaking inhabitants
residing in towns0 This figure indicates that during the inter-
census period the Russian population intended to concentrate in the
cities, and suggests that practically all the Russians who had
settled in Transcaucasia between 1897 and 1926 had moved into the
cities: the Russian population as a whole increased during this
period by 126,000 whereas the Russian urban population increased
by 131,000. Two hundred and eighteen thousand out of the 275,00O
Russian-speaking urban inhabitants resided in two towns, Baku and
Tiflis. The Armenians were again in the second place as regards
urbanization, with 29.3 per cent urban0 The Georgians and Azeri
Turks were more or less on the same level of urbanization, far
behind the Russians and Armenians; but it is significant that
during the inter-census period the Georgians, who in 1897 had
been the least urbanized group, now gained a slight edge over the
Azeri Turks. (Table 15).
Some of the national groups, which even in 1897 showed a high
degree of territori al corcentration under the system of puberni,
became even more comoact as a result of the irtroduction by the
Communists of the national-territorial system of administration.
The group which gained most in this respect were the Azeri Turks:
the boundaries of their reoubli c were drawn in such a way as to
include 84 per cent of all Azeri Turks living in the Soviet Union
(compared to the 65 per cent who had resided in the provinces
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of Baku and Elizavetopol in 1897). There was no substantial change
in the concentration of the Georgians and Armenians, which remained
very high for the former, and low for the latter. The Russians,
by virtue of their tendency to move into the cities, also became
more concentrated. Thus, notwithstanding the increased mobility of
the population, there was no sign of dispersal. In 1926, as in
1897, each nationality (the Armenians partly excepted) was identi--
fied with a definite territory or type of settlement.
The increased mobility also seemed to exercise no aporeciable
influence on the linguistic habits of the population. In 1926
93 per cent of all the inhabitants spoke their native languages0
Of the 405,000 who adopted other languages, 100,000 spoke Turkic,
82,000 Georgian, 39,000 Russian (exclusive of Ukrainian and
Belorussian), 1,600 Armenian, and lhl,000 the languages of other,
mostly Vorth Caucasian nationalities0 The gain of Russian was
accomplished almost entirely at the expense of European languages
(Yiddish, Polish, and German); only 2,500 Georgians and 10,000
Armenians adopted Russian. Georgian thus had made a clear gain
since 1397 when only 35,000 non-Georgians had spoken Georgian. In
1926 the category of Georgian-speaking non-Georgians consisted
mainly of Armenians (74,000). Turkic was adopted mostly by the
smaller MAiddle Eastern groups (Kurds, Tate, etc.), by nearly half
the Greeks, 13,000 Georgians, and 3,000 Armenians. It is worth
noting that the number of Georgians who adopted Turkic was five
times as large as the number of those who adopted Russian. Similarly
seven and a half times as mary Armenians switched to Georgian as to
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Russian. The Armenians were in 1926 as in 1897 least loyal to
their native language, 6.5 per cent Armenians speakirg other
languages (compared to 4i per cent in 1897). This information--
the most complete ever supplied on the linguistic affinities of
the population of the Russian state--suggests that (1) the in-
habitants of Transcaucasia continued to show a high degree of
loyalty to their native languages, and (2) the tendency of those
who, for one reason or amther, abandoned their mother tongue
was in the case of Europeans to adopt Russian, and in case of the
natives to adopt either Turki or Georgian.
The Inter-Census Period 1926-1939
After 1926 it becomes increasingly difficult to study popu-
lation changes in Transcaucasi a as ever thicker layers of secrecy
hide from the eyes of the foreign observer not only statistical
i rformation, but virtually all information of arr significance.
Between 1926 and 1932 the Soviet government released intermittently
some figures bearing on the present inquiry, and though most of
them are estimates, they are very useful in tracing developments
during this period0 But after 1932, when the terror of the "second"
or Stalinist revolution was gathering momentum, the sources dried
up completely. In 1937 there was a second Soviet All--Union census.
1. Ofthe 318,000 Armenians residing in Georgia who could read
one or more languages (alone or in various combinations)
80,000 read Armenian, and an almost equal number (7,000
and 50,000 respecti, ly) Georgian and kussiano Among the
literate Georgians in the Georgian SSR, totaling 701,000
527,000 read only Georgian, 170,000 Georgian and Russian
and 3,000 only Russian.
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Its results were apparently so appalling that they were never re-
leased, and its compilers were thrown into prison as "saboteurs."
the census of 1939, only partially released even at this late date,
must therefore be treated with considerable caution: obviously
figures which satisfied the Soviet regima better than those of the
preceding census must deviate from the truth at least in some
respects. In other words, for the period 1926-1939 bur sources of
information are highly inadequate. This holds particularly true
of problems connected with language and nationality, in part
because such information is always difficult to obtain except by
a regular census, and in part because the regime is particularly
reluctant to release figures on this subject*I
How these lacunae hinder the study of our topic will be
readily understood when one remembers that between 1926 and 1939
Transcaucasia was exposed to external forces more violent and more
profound than any that have faced it since the Mongol invasions of
the thirteenth century. Forced confiscation of all private landed
property in the guise of collectivisation, partial enserfment of
the industrial proletariat, exte rsive and often indiscriminate
arrests, all of which measures accompanied an enormous effort at
industrialisation-these well-known aspects of Stalinist rule must
1. The1939 census, for instance, did not supply data on the
ethnic structure of the constituent republics. Only since the
death of Stalin has this information been allowed to trickle
out in scattered sources, and even then only for the republics
which had suffered no excessive losses, or have had rela-
tively little Russian immigration.
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have had an overwhelming impact on Transcaucasian life in general,
and on its demograohic and ethnographic structure in particular.
Yet all these facts are so poorly documented in published sources
that they are known only in a general way.
Some things, however, are known, and one of them is that
the over-all population of Trarcaucasia increased at a rate that
was quite unprecedented even for that fertile area. Between 1926
and 1939 the population of Transcaucasia was reported to have
grown from 5,851,000 to 8,110,000 inhabitants, i.e., by 38.6 per
cent, more than double the rate of increase for the USSR as a
whole, This growth represented an average compourded rate of
2.5 per cent annually. This increase was not evenly spread over
the whole of the inter-census period, nor was it entirely due to
natural growth.1
To begin with, Soviet figures for the early 1930's indicate
beyond doubt that the rrirnipal increase occurred between 1926 and
1932. During these six years the population increased 3 per cent
annually. From 1932 to 1939 the rate of increase dropped to 24
per cent annually. The relative decline in the rate of growth may
be studied on the examples of Armenia and Azerbaijan for which
Soviet statistics happen to be available.
The po ation of Soviet Armenia, 1926-193 2
931 - 65. 0r b per cent annually
1936 - 1,187, or 2.5 per cent annually
1939 - 1,282, or 2.5 per cent annually
1. One must always keep in mind the possibility, and even
probability, that the 1939 figures have been deliberately
falsified.
2. Before the Revolution and during the period 1920-1926 the
population of Armenia had grown at an average annual rate of
2 per cent or slightly less.
po2uation of
2,9315,00
2,570,
2,785,000
3,210,00
Soviet Azerbaians 1926-1939
or 2.7 per cent annually
or b.0 per cent annually
or 2.0 per cent annually
Thus in the case of two of the three republics, the annual rate of
growth declined apvreciably after 1931-1932.
In the second place, the rapid increase of the population,
especially between 1926 and 1939 was in large measure due to the
mass influx of Russians from other parts of the Soviet Union0
Unfortunately, lacking full ethnographic data for 1939, we cannot
determine the exact number of these migrants; we can only estimate.
Here are the ethnic breakdowns of the three Transcaucasian
republics gathered from diverse Soviet sources, and compared with
the figures reported for 1926:
The population of Soviet Armenia in 1926 and 1939
(in thousands)1
Nationality 1926 1939 Change
Armenians 74b 8JL.77 1,062 Ut2.8 -1.9t
Azeri Turks 77 8.7 131 10.2 +1.5
Russians 23 2.6 56 bol +1.8
Others 35 l!,O 33 2.6 -1.l
The population of Soviet Azerbai an in 1926 and 1939
(in thousands)2
Nationality 1926 1939 Change
I
C
zeri Turks 1,0538 63.3 Co1,900 C. 9.%LI
tussians 2W2 10.7 512 16
rmenians 282 12.4 384 12
thers 308 13.5 hob 12.6
+5-3
-009
1. Armianskaia SSR, 51
2. Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, Article "Azerbaidzhan,"
gives the number of Azeri Turks in Azerbaijan in 1939 as
"over three-fifths of the population." The figure 59.A per
cent is arrived at by deducting the number ot Azeri Turks
known to live in other republics from that reoorted for the
USSR as a whole. This article reports the Russians as 16 per
cent, whereas the special volume of this Encyclopedia, SSSR,
(Moscow, 1918) p.1 86 3, says the Russians accounted for Wproxi-
mately 10 oer cent of the population."
The
1926 -
1930
1932 -
1939 -
26
The population of Soviet Georgia in 1926 and 1939
(in thousands)JL
Nationality 1926 1939 Change
Georgians 1,705 67.75 2,210 61., -6.35
Armenians 307 11.6 421 11.7 +0.1
Russians 111 h.2 c. 350 97 +5.5
Azeri Turks 138 5.2 190 5.3 +0.1
Ossetins 113 b.3 151 b.2 -0.1
Others 180 6.8 278 7.7 +0.9
These tables, although not entirely precise, yield some in-
teresting conclusions.
The striking fact is the increase of Russians. The total
Russian population of Transcaucasia increased between 1926 and 1939
from 376,000 to approximately 918,000. If we allow that the
resident Russian population increased at one-half the rate of the
Russian population in the whole USSR (which vas 27.1 per cent)--
an adjustment which must be made in view of the high degree of
urbanization and comparatively old age structure of the Russians
in Transcaucasia--we arrive at the figure of L26,000 for the resident
Russians. The remaining b92,000 must be considered Russians who
migrated into Transcaucasia during the inter-census period. It is
a high figure, but not remarkably so. In the four renublics of
Turkestan (Kirghiz, Tajik, Uzbek, and Turkmen) the Russian popula-
tion during the same Deriod increased by approximately 1,300,000,
i.e., two and a half times as much; in the Uzbek republic alone
there were an estimated 720,000 Russian migrants for a total
population of 6,300,000.2
1.BoTshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, Volume SSSR p. 1853,
To the reported t.7 per cent for Russians, I added an estimated
1 per cent for Ukrainians and Belorussians.
2. Cf. this author's "Muslims of Soviet Central Asia: Trends and
Prospects," The Middle East Journal, IX, No. 3, Summer 1955,
pp. 296-297.
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The %sasians increased most sharply in the Georgian republic,
where they more than tripled. The Russian migrants distributed
themselves anproximately as follows:
in Armenia 30,000
in Azerbaijan 237,000
in Georgia 22,000
The second significant fact is that, except in Georgia, the
category of the smaller nationalities declined. This suggests a
continuation of the process of assimilation of the smaller
nationalities observed in our analysis of the returns of the 1926
census0
The third important conclusion which emerges from these data
is that, notwithstanding industrialization and the great movements
of population which the first Five Year Plans entailed, the
principal native ra tionalities not only did not tend to scatter, but
on the contrary, became territorially even more compact than they
had been in 1926. In the case of both the Georgians and Azeri
Turks the number of those residing in their respective reoublics
remained urchanged: 98.2 per cent for the former, co 8h per cent
for the latter. The Armenians, however, tended to concentrate in
the Armenian reoublic, and the proportion of those who resided
there increased from 17. per cent in 1926 to h9.h oer cent in
1939.
The urban population in Transcaucasia stood in 1939 at
2,593,700, or 32 per cent (Azerbaijan 36.2 per cent, Georgia 30.1
per cent, Armenia 28o6 per cent). This was a fifty per cent in-
crease since 1926. Most of that growth had occurred in the first
half of the inter-census neriod, especially in the years 1930,1931,
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and 1932. Thus, for example, the urban population of Azerbaijan
increased from 1926 to 1932 by 5.3 oer cent and between 1932 and
1939 only by 2.8 ner cent. The total numerical gain of the urban
population in Transcaucasia was 1,181,000, of which 510,000 in
Azerbaijan, 072,000 in Georgia, and 199,000 in Armenia.
These figures acquire added significance when juxtaposed to
the figures showing the estimated influx of Russians. If we allow
that the population residing in the cities of Transcaucasia in 1926
remained constant throughout the inter-census period, and in-
creased at a rate two-thirds as large as the population of the
republic in which it was located, we find that the resident urban
population increased from 1926 to 1939 by 365,000: 187,000 in
Azerbaijan, 128,000 in Georgia, and 50,000 in Armenia. The new
urban population, therefore, was around 816,000. Here is its
distribution by republics, and the estimated migrant population:
Increase in the urban population and in the Russian popu-
lation of Transcaucasia, 1926-1939
T eoublic !ew urban ,opulation New Russian Difference
Ponulation
Azerbaijan 312,000 237,000 105,000
Arnenia 1b9,000 30,000 119,000
Georgia 315,000 22b,000 121,000
If the experience of the period 1897-1926 is any indication, then
it may be assumed that for all practical purposes the entire
Russian immigration rioved into the cities. Land in Transcaucasia
is scarce, much of the agriculture is of a technical kind for which
the migratory Russians lack skills, and in general the conditions
for Russian colonization are not propitious. On the other hand, the
development of the petroleum industries, railroads, and the whole
administrative as well as technical machinery which the Soviets
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require, nrovide inducements for Russian urban settlement. If
that assumption is correct, then the national composition of the
Transcaucasian cities in 1939 would. have looked approximately as
follows:
Natives - 70 per cent
Russians - 30 per cent
These figures indicate a steady growth of the Russian share in the
the urban population. In 1897 Russians had constituted 22 per
cent of the total urban population of Transcaucasia, and in 1926
19 Der cent. Seventy oer cent of the urban population equals
1,815,000 which signifies that the proportion of non-Russians who
resided in the cities in 1939 was 25 per cent. In 1926 the urban
share of the non-Russian population had been 20 per cent. These
numbers suggest that the Russian population in the cities was
increasing at a more rapid rate than the non-Russian population
(the Armenians excepted).
We lack data to analyze the relative fertility of the principal
national groups, but the rate of population growth over the whole
period suggests that the Armenians outstripped the Azeri Turks in
fertility, the Georgians continuing to occupy third place, The
rate of increase was 59.0 per cent for the Armenians, 33.2 per cent
for the Azeri Turks, and 18. per cent for the Georgians.
There are reasons to suppose that the Georgians continued to
adapt themselves to the changes wrought by the Soviet regime better
than their neighbors. The main reason for this adaptability is
the nature of the Georgian elite, Whereas among the Armenians the
elite was middle-class in origin, and among the Azeri Turks it
30
consisted largely of well-to-do landlords--both classes actively
persecuted and eventually destroyed by the Bolsheviks--the Georgian
elite was an intelligentsia. Of all social classes in Russia, the
intelligentsia had the best chances of survival. Relying on
technical and administrative skills the Georgian intelligentsia,
even when "contaminated" by nationalist ard Me rshevik ideals,
could somehow fit into the Soviet system. The intellectuals were
at worst oersecuted as political foes, whereas the Armenian and
Azeri Turkic leaders vere persecuted as political and social foes. 1
The other factor which helped the Georgians weather the storm was
the fact that Stalin and Beria were Georgians. Now it may be open
to doubt whether Stalin or Beria really intended to accord the
Georgians a privileged status in Soviet society; but it is un-
de riable that many of the other nationalities thought they did, and,
unwilling to expose thenselves to unnecessary risks of punishment,
gladly accorded the Georgians the primacy which the Georgians
eagerly acknowledged. In a society such as the Soviet, where so
much of public life revolves around personal relations and is
determined by subtle changes in the climate of opinion prevailing
in the government, this psychological superiority of the Georgians
was of immense importance to their capacity for survival, Georgian
national feeling, intense to begin with, was further intensified
1. 'eorgia was traditionally top-heavy with an intelligentsia. In
191, for instance, it had more snecialists with a higher edu-
cation than Armenia and Azerbaijan rnut together, and it was
consiste ily in first place in the number of all other kinds
of specialists and students of all ages. All through the Soviet
period Georgia was and continues to be the best educated
reoublic. The high level of education is not directly pro-
portionate to Georgia's economic development, and therefore
causes social ferment well-knowm from other colonial and ex-
colonial areas.
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by the influx of Russians in the 1930's. This influx, which brought
to Georgia an estimated 224,000 Russians and tripled the number of
Russians residing in the Georgian republic, was without precedent
in the history of that area. Even in the best circurstances the
sudden accretion of a foreign population by such numbers and in
so short a time is bound to produce ill-will and social unrest.
In the Soviet Union such effects are more violent than elsewhere
because of the acute housing shortage. There has been little con-
struction in Tiflis, and the housing space per capita has been
declining steadily since 1926, which means that the influx of
Russians carsed very real hardships for the native population.
All these considerations help explain why the Georgians were
best able to meet the challenge of the 1930's. Their unspectacular
but steady population growth contrasts vividly with the uneven
demographic evolution of their two neighbors.
The Armenians were saved by two factors from the complete
destrUction which faced them in consequence of Turkish and Communist
persecutions. One of them was the fact that they had a relatively
large urban population. In view of the privileged position which
the urban inhabitants enjoy in the Soviet system visa-vis the
rural inhabitants, the Armenians acquired a proportionately greatek
share of the political and social benefits than the less urbanized
Azeri Turks. The second advantage was that of the three Trans--
caucasian groups the Armenrans were least anti-Russian. The
Communist regimre, distrusting the nationalism of the Georgians and
Azeri Turks, tended to rely on the Armenians, much as the Tsarist
regime used to do on occasion,
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'Of all the national groups, the Azei-i Turks lost most social
and political status under -he new regie. They were mst heavily
agricultural and had the smallest intelligentsia, which meant that
they were least able to adapt themselves to the new conditions,
and were mnst burdened with obligations. In urbanization as well
as fertility they were slowly slipping behind the Georgians and
Armenians, respectively. Their national elite vanished early in
the Soviet period, leaving them virtually without a voice in the
political cliques where the fate of the region was being decided.
There is evidence that in the period 1926-1939 the conflict
between the Azeri Turks and Armenians lost much of its previous
intensity. This conflict originally had three causes: religious
(the clash between iuslims and Christians), national (the antago-
rilsm between Turk and Armenian in the Ottoman Empire), and social
(the mutual dislike of a peasant and unskilled laborer for the
middle class). The religious conflict subsided in consequence of
the fact that the Commuist regime removed religion altogether
from the sphere of public life. The rational conflict lost is
raison dletre with the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. The
social conflict disappeared with the elimination of all private
enterprises in business as well as land.
This is not to say, however, that national antagonism dis--
appeared altogether from Transcaucasia. Rather, it shifted. The
old conflict between Turks and Armenians seems to have been re-
placed by a rew conflict between the Georgians with their sub-
groups (Adjars, Abkhaz, and possibly Ossetins), and the other
nationalities. This conflict was caused by the privileged position
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which the Georgians, because of the factors enumerated above were
able to enjoy under Stalin. The national animosities still
had a socio-economic foundation: what mattered was the struggle
for the benefits which could be gained only by securing the
largest possible hold on the apparatus of the state. Economic
benefits were, therefore, decided on a bureaucratic plane: here
the Georgians and Russians enjoyed the greatest advantages. It
is not unreasonable to suppose that the lines of conflict were
drawn as follows: the Russians and Armenians united in their
anti-Georgian sentiment, and the Azeri Turks on the side, hostile
to all, specially to the Georgians and Russians as the two most
orivileged groups.
The Period 1939-1956
For this period there are no population statistics, except
for three figures released in 1956 which reported the estimated
population of each of the three republics.
The striking fact about these figures is the sharp decline in
the rate of growth. If the population of Transcaucasia had grown
between 1939 and 1956 at the same rate as between 1926 and 1939,
it would have increased from 8,100,000 to 11,000,000. Actually,
it increased only to 9,000,000. From this we conclude that (1)
there was a corsiderable decline in fertility, and (2) there was
little or no migration from other parts of the country. The
annual rate of growth for Transcatcasia as a whole dropped from
an average of 2 per cent (1932-1939) to 0.6 oer cent.
1 An exception to the second of these statements are the 100,000
Armenians known to have migrated to Soviet Armenia immediately
after World War II1
Armenia, which grew from 1,200,000 to 1,600,000 showed the
most rapid rate of growth; setting apart foreign immigrants, its
population increased by 15.h per cent. Georgia ranked next in the
rate of growth, with 11.1 per cent, and Azerbaijan last with 6.2
per cent. The Azeri Turks, therefore, continued to show further
synptoms of a demographic decline, the first signs of which were
already visible in the censuses of 1926 and 1939. The Georgians,
on the other hand, notwithstanding their comparatively low fertility,
kept on forging steadily ahead.
Barring major population shifts between 1939 and 1956, the
ethnic structure of Transcaucasia at the present time should look
approximately as follows:
Georgians - 2.6 million
Armenians - 2.1 million
Azeri Turks - 2.3 million
Russians - 1.2 million
Others - 0.8 million
If these estimates are correct, only the Georgians and Armenians
would have experienced any significant natural increase since 1939,
with approximately 400,000 births over deaths (to which must be
added 100,000 immigrants for the Armenians). The Azeri Turks and
Russians probably showed an insignificant increase of 100-200'000
each. (Table 17).
The failure of Transcaucasia to grow demographically at ar-
thing like its traditionally high rate is even more significant
when one bears in mind that this area was never occupied by the
ener in World War II, and in consequence was spared most of the
horrors which had decimated the population in the Western regions
of the Soviet Union. The dramatic decline of the rate of growth,
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therefore, cannot be directly related to the war, and must have
occurred in consequence of inner developments, the nature of which
is presently unknown.
One of the factors which may account for the decline in the
rate of growth of the population may have been the relative decline
of the ivortance of Transcaucasia in the econonq of the Soviet
Union. This latter process may be traced in various ways. One
is to study the indices showing the rate of increase of the gross
national output (valovaia produktalia) between 19L0 and 1950, which
in Georgia and Azerbaijan has been slower than that of the whole
USSR. The other is to juxtapose the figures showing the share of
the whole re-ublic budgets assigned to the three Transcaucasian
republics: it was in 1933,12 percent; in 1937, 1 per cent; in
1953, 5.6 per cent and in 1957, h.h per cent. An important reason
for this decline, especially after World War II, was the shift of
the oil industry from Transcaucasia to the Urals and Central Asia.
Such economic shrinking is often accompanied by a drop in the rate
of population growth. It is perfectly possible, too, that the
Russian population in Transcaucasia, especially in Azerbaijan,
actually declined as Russian technical personnel was mved to the
new oil-producing areas. In that event the growth of the Azeri
Turkic population would have been bigger than the estimate above
allows. There certainly can be no doubt that the strategic vul-
nerability of Transcaucasia has impelled the Soviet regime after 1945
to reduce its investments in that area, and that this reduction in
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investments has had a ,rofound effect on the general growth of
the population. 1
1 In this connection it may be suggested that one of the ways to
study the movements of the population in the Soviet Union,
especially of the Russian population, is to analyze investment
and budget figures. It is likely that ary region which shows
a. sudden spurt in its financial resources is at the same time
a -region subject to intense Russian immigration, since the
bulk of the administrative, technical, and qualified labor
personnel is imported from Russia proper. For instance, the
share of Kazakhstan in the union republic budgets jumped between
1953 and 1955 from b.2 ner cent to 7.9 oer cent. It ras
during this very time that an estimated one to one and a half
million Russians moved into that renublice
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Conclusions
The graph showing the population growth in Transcaucasia over
the past sixty years has the shape of a curve which rises until
1932 (except for the decade 1914-1924, the losses of which were made
up in the years 192b-1932), and then declines, at first gradual3y,
and later precipitously. The annual rate of growth which was
1.7 ner cert before the first World War, rose to 3.0 per cent
between 1926 and 1932, then declined to 2.4 per cent (1933-1939),
and then further to 0.6 per cent (1939-1956). This decline was in
part due to declining fertility brought about by the general
"modernization" of the inhabitants (urbanization, ageing, etc.),
as well as by the uncertainties of life under the Soviet regime,
and in part by the relative economic decline of Transcaucasia since
World War II, which, among other things, put a stop to Russian
immigration and perhaps even caused some Russians to depart.
The various nationalities inhabiting Transcaucasia adapted
themselves with varying degrees of success to the changes which
time has brought. In general, the Georgians seem to have done
best. They owe their success to several favorable circumstancesz
the nature of their elite, the high cultural level of the popula-
tion, the territorial compactness of their inhabitants, the large
proportion of young people, and the favorite position which they
enjoyed under Stalin and Beria. Demographically and culturally
they have proven themselves over the past sixty years to be the
most consistently dynamic nationality in Transcaucasia.
The Armenians have been somewhat less fortunate than the
Georgians. They had suffered enormous losses during and after
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World War I, losses which they made good in remarkably short time
owing to their extraordinary fertility, but which nevertheless left
deep scars on their over-all demographic structure. Culturally,
they have shown the least cohesion, and in Georgia especially (where
nearly one-fourth of all the Transcaucasian Armenians reside) they
have shown themselves very succeptible to alien influences. What
has helped the Armenians weather the storms of the past four decades
has been their high fertility and relatively high urbanization.
The Azeri Turks have undoubtedly fared worst of the three
principal indigenous nationalities. Despite the fact that in
1897 they were the most numerous as well as the most fertile group
in Transcaucas:ia, throughout the past sixty years they have been
steadily falling behind their neighbors in all those respects which
make for demographic dynamism. Their over-all growth has been
the slowest, and they have fallen behind in urbanization as well
as fertility The relative decline of this nationality must be
attributed mainly to its low cultural standards, and to its social
structure: The Azeri peasantry suffered probably more heavily than
the less independent and proportionately less numerous Georgian
and Armenian peasantry in the period of collectivization. The
decline of the Azeri Turks is part of the general process of
decline of the Turkic population of the Soviet Union.
Of the other rnational groups, Russians excepted, the following
general rule holds true: They tend to identify themselves with
those major national groups which a-e closest to them in religion,
language, and other cultural respects. This means that the European
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minorities assimilate to the Russians, and the others either with
the Georgians (if they are Christian) or Aseri Turks (if they are
Muslim). For this reason they are not dynamic, and have been
shrinking.
The Russian inhabitants do not seem to have gained a firm
foothold in Transcaucasia. In fact, one seems to discern something
of an ebb and flow which is quite unlike the movement observed in
other borderland areas. The influx of Russians occurred twice:
at the end of the nineteenth century, and then again in the early
1930's. In the period of war and revolution a part of the Russian
population left for Russia proper, and it is very likely that a
similar. exodus has been taking place since the end of World War II.
The reason for this is that the Russians are primarily urban,
and therefore very sensitive to political and economic fluctuations.
Only in those areas where they settled en masse on the land (e.g.,
Volga-Ural region, Kazakhstan, the Crimea) have the Russians been
able to secure a solid and oermanent hold on the territory and
its population.
It thus appears that demographically Transcaucasia is within
a Georgian "sphere of influence." The decline in Georgian political
orestige since 1953, and the. general economic decline .of Trans-
caucasia during the oast 13 years have acted as powerful irritants
stimulating Georgian nationalisms which on occasions (e.g.,
soring of 1956) assumes violent forms.
ho
TABLE I
The population of Transcaucasia
1897
191hi
1920-1922
1926
1929
1931
1932
1933
1939
1956
Ii,93,000
5,990,000
5,321,000
5,851,000
6,273,000
6,775,000
6,976,000
7,110,000
8,110,000
9,000,000
TABLE 2
Average annual rate of growth
1897-191
1926-1929
1929-1932
1933-1939
1939-1956
1.7%
2.5
3a7
2.h
0.6
TAPLE 3
Fertility ratios in 189'
Province Fertility ratio
Baku
Elizavetopol
Erivan
Tiflis
Kutais
Kars District
TRAISCAUCASIA
897
1,032
977
670
835
1,000
876
1 1
TATLE h
Age distribution in 1897
15.-60 60 Fnd over
Baku
Elizavetopol
Erivan
Tiflis
Kutais
Kars District
TRAISCAPCASIA
313,800
362,000
357,700
l21,000
lt31,200
107,100
1,991,000
h0.3%
76,000
h7ho,000
133,000
567,000
511,100
166,000
2,657,000
53.8%
TABLE 5
Sex ratios in 1897
Province
Baku
Elizavetopol,
Erivan
Tiflis
Kutais
Kars District
TRASCA7"CASIA
Ratio of men
for 100 women
12h
120
114
121
108
123
117
TABLE 6
Linistic structure of the urban popuation in 1897
(in thousands)
Azeri Turks Armenians
Baku 1,0
Elizavetopol 0,7
Erivan 0,1A
Tiflis 71,0
Kutais b8,0
Kars 0.3
TRA'SCAUCASIA 121,14
*Includes Ottoman Turks
Prbvince 0-1
37,100
42,200
39,000
63,000
85,600
16,700
282,000
5.9%
Province Georgians Russians
82,0
50,0
2h,5
5,5
h,10*
L,5*
170,5
23,0
23,0
54,0
74s,0
14,5
16,5
205,0
42,0
4,0
9,0
53,0
26,0
10,0
144,0
N
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TABLE 7
Urban and rural population in 1897
(in thousands)
Baku
Elisavetopol
Erivan
Tifts
Kutais
Kars
TRANSCAUCASIA
Rural
657
789
921
826
961
253
4,222
Total
827
878
829
1,051
1,058
290
h,923
Per cent urban
21.0%
10.1
11.0
21.3
9.1
12.7
14.4
TABLE 8
Inhabitants by place of birth in 1097
Born locally Born in another
part of same
province
Born outside
given province
Baku
Elizavetopol
Erivan
Tiflis
Kutais
Kars District
87.1,%
92.5
92.7
82.9
86.3
68.2
3.5
2.8
6.0
8.6
1.6
TALE 9
Linguistic affinities of the population in 1897
(in thousands)
Province Georgi
Baku 1.5
Elizavetopol 1.0
Erivan 0.5
Tiflis 467.0
Kutais 868.0
Kars 005
TRA!SCATCASIA 1,33845
Turkic*
486.0
53h.0
313.0
131.0
46.0
103.0
1,613.0
Armenian
52.0
292.0
144.0
196.0
214.0
73.0
1,078.0
*Includes Azeri, Osmwnli and other Turkic dialects.
Pronvince Urban
170
89
92
225
97
37
710
Province
8.5%
4.0
.5
11.1
9.1
30.2
Russian
78.0
18.0
16.0
86.0
23.0
28.0
2h9.0
Prnvi "go-A Runi To al
Province
TABLE 10
Growth of the three principal Transcaucasian nationalities
1897-1939 (in the whole USSR)
1897 1926 1939
Azeri Turks
Armenians
Georgians
/1, 9,000/
1,100,000
1,352,000
1,700,000
1,500,000
1,900,000
2,275,000
2,150,000
2,250,000
TABLE 11
Rate of growth of the principal Transcaucasian nationalities
1i97-1939
Nationalitv
Azeri Turks
Armenians
Georgians
Russians
1897-1926
/9.85/
36.3
6o.5
56.2
1926-1939
33.2%
59.0
18.i0
c. 115.0
TABLE 12
Fertility ratios of the principal groups inhabiting
Transcaucasia in 1926
Azeri Turks
Armenians
Georgians
Russians
All others
TRA'ISCAUCASIA
908
807
631
372
764
746
TABLE 13
Age distribution by rationality in 1926
Nationality 0-l11 60 and over
Azeri Turks
Armenians
Georgians
Russians
?Tz4Nainl tv
h2.0%
10.9
38.6
27 .h
50.3%
I8.7
52a.1
68.5
7o 7.
10.
9.3
b .1
M.o+ e%,n Al 4 +.v 189 1926 1939
Na~~~~ i ait89-92
Na iona.31tv
b4
TABLE 14
Sex ratios by lirguistic affinities in 1926
Azeri Turks
Armenians
Georgians
Russians
Average for above
four groups
11
103
100
102
106
TABLE 15
Prooortion of members of each liruistic group residing
in cities in 1897 and 1926
Linguistic group
Aeri Turks
Arme nians
Georgians
Russians
1897
10.5%
19.8
9.0
57.8
1926
16.6%
2933
17.7
7303
TABLE 16
Urbanization by reiublics 1897-1939
1897*
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Georgia
TRASCAT' CASIA
15.2%
1.0
15.2,
1. A
1926
28.1%
19.0
22.2
2h.1
1939
36.2%
28.6
30.1
32.0
TABLE 17
The population of Transcaucasia by national groups 1897-1956
(in millions)
1897**
Azeri Turks
Armenians
Georgians
Russians
Others
TOTAL
1.6
1.1
103
0.2
0.3
1.5
1926
1.3
1.8
0.h
o.6
1939
2.2*
1.9
2.3
0.9
0.7
8.1
*Estimated
,**Liradst Icr,- cr-Ite ri on us e d.
Republic
1956*
2.3
2.1
2.6
1,2
0.8
9,0
Lin-auistic. e roun 1897
1897**
Nationality

